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ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to answer some questions about the financial capacity of local
governments to implement regional autonomy.  In the early stages of the implementation of
autonomy, financial aspects have been crucial for every kabupaten and kota administration1.
According to Laws No.22, 1999 and No.25, 1999, financial management is an important
indicator of local government performance in determining whether they can continue as
autonomous entities or should be merged with other neighboring kabupaten or kota.
Some of the related issues to be discussed include: what is the regional budget allocation that
each local government is to receive and what is the formula applied by the central
government to determine this allocation?  Is the allocated budget smaller than the amount
received by local governments prior to regional autonomy?  Is the allocated budget from the
central government less than the amount required for local civil servant salaries and routine
bureaucratic and administrative expenses?  Why have local governments been so eager to
increase local revenues?  What is the likely impact of this on the business climate?
Based on the results of field studies conducted by SMERU in twelve kabupaten and kota
across nine provinces, it is apparent that in many cases, local governments at the kabupaten
and kota level have received an allocation of funds from the central government that exceeds
routine expenditures.  However, this level of funding is substantially less than the total
transferred into the regions (including funds received by central government offices operating
at the kabupaten and kota level) during the period before regional autonomy. It is a different
matter, however, at the province level where the allocation of funds from the central
government is much smaller than their routine expenditures. The size of the budget allocation
is one the key reasons given by local bureaucrats to explain why local governments, both at
the kabupaten and kota level as well as at the provincial level, have been working hard to
increase local revenues by imposing more local taxes and levies.
The negative impact of these levies on the business and investment climate has not been fully
captured by recent field studies. Local businessmen have pointed out that most levies have
not yet been fully imposed and there is some variation between regions in the degree of their
commitment to the creation of these new taxes. But it is widely accepted by local
businessmen that all these new levies will create distortions in the market and a high-cost
economy in the near future. Some indications of these potential distortions can be already
identified and will be discussed in detail in the paper.
If this pattern continues without any amendments by local government or if the central
government fails to intervene, another fundamental question arises: will regional autonomy
be able to achieve its important goals of improving the quality of public services and
increasing the participation of local business in the local economy in the regions throughout
Indonesia?
                                                          
1 Kabupaten is the Indonesian term for district under province level while Kota is the term applied to
municipalities.
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I.   INTRODUCTION
Introduction of regional autonomy, local governments have gained greater
opportunities to provide broader coverage and better public services in their region.
At the same time, the central government has lost its power to dictate regional
government policies. One of the key elements in this change has been the reform of
the intergovernmental fiscal relationship. This involves the decentralization of
central government authority over expenditure and revenue to local governments.
The fiscal decentralization policy is intended to increase the efficiency of the
provision of regional public services, by allowing a better matching of expenditures
with regional needs, priorities, preferences and revenue capabilities. This policy is
being implemented following the introduction of Law No.25 issued in 1999.
This paper attempts to answer some questions about the financial capacity of local
governments to implement regional autonomy. According to Law No.25/1999,
financial issues are an important indicator of local government performance in which
may determine whether they will be able to continue as autonomous entities or
whether they should be merged with other neighboring kabupaten or kota.
Some related issues that need to be considered include the following: what is the
regional budget allocation that each local government is to receive, and what is the
formula applied by the central government to determine this allocation?  Is the
allocated budget smaller than the amount received by local governments prior to
regional autonomy?  Is the allocated budget from the central government less than
the amount required for local civil servant salaries and routine bureaucratic and
administrative expenses?  Why have local governments been so eager to increase
local revenues?  Most importantly, what is the likely impact of these changes on the
business climate? The answers to the above questions will be provided by referring to
some of the studies SMERU researcher have conducted in nine provinces and 13
kabupaten and kota during the period between June 2000 to June 2001.  Of special
importance are the results drawn from the study of six kabupaten2 that were visited
following the implementation of Laws No.22, 1999 and No.25, 1999 that become
effective in January 2001.
                                                          
2 They are Kabupaten Bolmong, Deli Serdang, Gorontalo, Karo, Minahasa, and Simalungun.
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2. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET PRIOR TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
Structures of Local Government Revenues
Before the implementation of decentralization and regional autonomy, there were
two types of grants and subsidies allocated by the central government. The first
allocation was used for routine expenditure, such as local government civil service
salaries as well as for bureaucratic expenditure at the kabupaten and kota levels of
government. The second type of allocation covered funds that are directed for the
purpose of investment or government development expenditure.
For routine expenditure purposes, the funds were transferred through subsidies from
the central government. This subsidy was the main source of direct income for the
kabupaten and kota as indicated in Table 1, where for the financial year 1999/2000
this contributed about 60% of total kabupaten and kota revenues.
Table 1
Structure of local Government Revenues Before Decentralization
(FY1999/2000)
( in percentage share )
Kabupaten /
kota
Tax & non-tax
Revenue
sharing
Routine
Budget
Subsidy
Development
Funds
Local
Source of
Revenues Others
Total
Revenues
(billion rp)
1.Banjarmasin * 11.90 52.47 17.82 17.24 0.57 87.3
2.Bolmong 8.71 66.14 22.00 3.16 0.00 72.3
3.Gorontalo 10.10 66.01 21.33 2.55 0.00 94.2
4.Karo 9.75 65.25 15.59 9.41 0.00 75.4
5.Kudus 6.92 61.77 15.77 15.13 0.41 78.7
6.West Lombok 6.61 46.77 32.09 14.48 0.05 101.1
7.Magetan 10.09 70.27 13.71 5.76 0.17 97.3
8.Minahasa 10.96 75.20 11.01 2.83 0.00 139.8
9.Sukabumi * 7.31 51.88 24.10 14.59 2.12 56.9
10.Sanggau 7.34 59.79 30.36 2.03 0.47 86.0
11.Solok 6.66 56.54 33.46 2.96 0.39 90.5
12.Simalungun 12.63 65.14 18.77 3.46 0.00 144.8
Note: *) Kota
Source: SMERU Field Study Results
For investment or development expenditure purposes, the funds were transferred in
two different types of subsidies. The first type was in the form of grants that were
allocated for specific purposes designed by the central government, such as to build
schools and health facilities at the kabupaten level. The second type of allocation was
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in the forms of block grants that could be used according to the needs of kabupaten
and kota without any intervention from the central government. However, the
amount of this type of subsidy was much less than the former. Total funds for
investment purposes is only contributing approximately 20% of kabupaten and kota
revenue. In addition to these two kinds of funds transferred, the central government
also provided local governments with a share of tax and non-tax revenues that
contributed less than 10% of kabupaten and kota total revenues. The use of these
funds was fully controlled by the local government.
The remaining 10% of kabupaten and kota income was derived from local revenues
(PAD) and other insignificant sources. Local revenues are now a much more
controversial issue and will be further discussed in section 4.
Central Government Transfers Allocated Through Vertical Government Offices
Operating At Kabupaten/Kota Level
In the past, the central government transferred money to the regions not only
through the local government administration, but also through its “vertical” offices
operating in the regions. This funding was commonly known as DIP3 funding (project
lists proposed by each office). The amount was much higher than the total revenues
received by local government.  Table 2 provides average figures of total central
government funds allocated to all regions during the 1990s. In terms of percentage of
GDP, the total funds allocated to the DIP was 5.2% of GDP. This was considerably
higher than the total grants and subsidies allocated for routine and development
expenditures which were only 3.5% of GDP.
These funds, however, are no longer transferred under the system of regional
autonomy. As a result of the decentralization process, all “vertical” government
offices at the kabupaten level are automatically becoming part of the local
government administration. They have been included in the new organizational
structure of regional governments at the kabupaten and kota level.  The budgetary
timplications of this new positioning these former “vertical” agencies is that both
routine and development budgets will be managed by local government.  In this case,
the local government will use the new block grants for this purpose.
                                                          
3 DIP is daftar isian proyek, Project list that every financial year financed by central government
trough technical department. Central office of technical department allocates further to its office
operating in kabupaten and kota level.
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Table 2
Transferred Funds to Kabupaten and Kota Level:
Expressed as a Percentage of GDP
(Average Figures During the 1990s)
Items Percentage of GDP:
A. Transferred to local government: 3.5%
        - For routine budget (2.2%)
        - For development budget (1.3%)
B. Transferred to central government vertical
        institutions operating at the district level 5.2%
C. Total (A+B) 8.7%
Source: Raksaka, 2000  (Table 2).
3. DAU (GENERAL ALLOCATION OF FUNDS) GENERAL
PURPOSE BLOCK GRANTS IN THE FIRST YEAR OF
DECENTRALIZATION (2001)
According to Law No.25, 1999, the allocated funds from the central government are
block grants to be used by the local government according to their own priorities.
This is contrary to the mechanism applied by the central government prior to the
implementation of regional autonomy, where the local government only carried out
those programs designed by the central government.
The total amount to be allocated to the regions under regional autonomy is at least
25% of national domestic revenue (after excluding the special share to be returned to
resource-rich regions), 90% of this amount is to be allocated to kabupaten and kota,
and the remaining 10% is to be allocated to the provinces. In absolute value terms,
the total amount of the block grants for all regions for the FY 2001 is Rp60.5 trillion
or equivalent to US$6.1 million (at an exchange rate of Rp10.000/US$1).
DAU Funds Compared with the Total Amount Transferred Before Decentralization
The amount of DAU block grants received by the twelve kabupaten and kota visited
by SMERU is displayed in Table 3. Apart from Kabupaten Karo, all other kabupaten
received a much higher amount of DAU compared to the total funds received in
1999/2000 financial year, the last year before the implementation of regional
autonomy. Four kabupaten, Bolmong in North Sulawesi, Kudus in Central Java, Magetan
in East Java and Sanggau in West Kalimantan , received an increase of more than 100%.
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Table 3
DAU Block Grant and Transferred Funds Before Decentralization
(in billions of rupiah)
Kabupaten / Kota DAU Block Grant
Transferred funds
In FY 1999/2000
Increase
(%)
1.  Banjarmasin * 127.9  72.3  76.9
2.  Bolmong 140.8  70.0  101.1
3.  Gorontalo 148.6  91.8  61.9
4.  Tanah Karo 92.5  68.3  35.4
5.  Kudus 175.6  66.8  162.9
6.  West Lombok 165.1  86.4  91.1
7.  Magetan 208.9  91.7  127.8
8.  Minahasa 260.4  135.8  91.8
9.  Sukabumi * 81.3  48.6  67.3
10.Sanggau 192.4  84.3  128.2
11.Solok 150.8  87.9  71.6
12.Simalungun 260.3  139.8  86.2
Note: *) Kota
Source: SMERU field survey results .
The Formula Used to Determine DAU Block Grants4
The formula applied to determine the amount of the DAU block grants allocated to
each region is as follows:
25% of the national budget set aside for block grants X 90% for all Kabupaten
and Kota X Weight of each kabupaten and kota
The calculation of the weights for each kabupaten of kota is based on two main
factors: local needs and the local potential of kabupaten or kota. Needs are
represented by variables such as the size of the population, the number of people
living below the poverty line, and the total area of physical size the kabupaten or kota.
This is a positive linear relationship where the larger the population, the larger the
total number of people living below the poverty line, as well as the greater the area
covered, the larger will be the weight for the region and hence the larger the amount
of the block grant to be allocated to the particular kabupaten or kota.
Local potential is depend upon the number and the scale of industrial activities
operating in the particular kabupaten or kota. This relates to the capacity of kabupaten
or kota to raise revenues through taxes and levies from existing economic activities.
Consequently, the relationship is negative: the greater a region’s potential to create
                                                          
4 Adopted from Mahi (2000) and Keputusan Pemerintah No.181 (2000)
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revenue, the smaller the weight for the region and the lower the block grant to be
allocated to the particular kabupaten or kota.
Three possible methods were proposed in the way weight were to be calculated:  a)
equal weight between the needs and the potential for all regions; b) a greater
emphasis on needs, meaning that those variables that determine a region’s needs are
given greater consideration; or c) a greater emphasis on local potential, where the
capacity of a region to raise local revenues is given more consideration.
Unfortunately, however, there is no precise information available about which of the
three methods was implemented in calculating the first DAU block grant for the
2001 financial year.  The data in Table 3 suggests that it is most likely that the
central government used the first scenario.
In addition, in allocating the DAU block grants the central government is also
considering the following basic principles:
1. Adequacy:  the DAU should be able to fulfill adequately the needs of the regions
in at least providing standard public services. It must also take into account the
demand of the regions that the block grants should not be smaller than what the
region received prior to the implementation of regional autonomy.
2. Accountability and transparency: local governments must be accountable to
their electorates, not to the central government. Local governments should make
the information on funding and expenditure available to the general public. In
this matter, the local parliament has a very important role to play.
3. Neutrality and efficiency: the DAU should not create any distortion in the
economy that could become a source of inefficiency.
4. LOCAL REVENUES (PAD)
Sources of Local Revenues
There are two main sources of local revenues (PAD). The first is local taxes and the
second is levies.  Both play an important role, as indicated in Table 4, where 10 out
of 13 kabupaten and kota investigated have received about 90% of their local revenues
from these two main sources. Only three kabupaten received significant amount of
The SMERU Research Institute, September 20017
revenue from other sources, mainly from domestic borrowing and local government
asset yields.  In many kabupaten, the two main sources of local revenues provide
relatively equal contributions. However, in the resource-rich and more developed
kabupaten and kota, local taxes are more dominant than levies.
The main sources of local taxes at the kabupaten and kota level are mostly derived
from street lighting tax, entertainment business tax, the use of ground and surface
water tax, hotel and restaurant tax, as well as the exploitation and processing of C
classification mining activities5 tax.
The actual sources of local levies are more variable and each kabupaten has its own
particular sources. Levies mostly depend on the type of local economic activities and
extent of the commitment of the local government in formulating regulations in this
area. This is determined by the ability of the local government to identify potential
revenues, the freedom they have to impose levies, and the extent of their need to find
of additional source of income to finance their routine and development expenditure.
PAD Targets for 2001
During the early phase of the implementation of regional autonomy, local
governments tended to be more aggressive in collecting taxes and levies (PAD).
Table 5 demonstrates that, apart from Kabupaten Karo, the other five kabupaten
visited during the early phases of regional autonomy, have targeted PAD for the 2001
FY to a level that is approximately 100% higher than they had achieved in the
1999/2000 FY. To achieved this target, the local government in each of these
kabupaten has issued a number of local regulations on this subject.  Some kabupaten
have drafted up to 30 new local regulations.
By contrast, Kabupaten Karo has tended to adopt a more moderate policy over the
creation new regulations on local taxes and levies.  In part this may be a result of the
appointment of a new bupati (the head of kabupaten government) who has experience
in business. Due to his background, the new leader is reluctant to impose to many
levies.  However, it is still too early to conclude that this local government will
continue to maintain such as moderate stance. Interviews suggest that other local
government officials in Kabupaten Karo are more committed to locating new revenue
sources in the near future.  For example, the deputy bupati pointed out that
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Kabupaten Karo has an abundance of agricultural commodities, which have a huge
potential as a source of local revenue.
Table 4
Sources of local government revenues, FY1999 and FY2000
(in percentage share)
Kabupaten / Kota
Local
Taxes
Local
Levies
Contribution
from local
Government
Enterprises
Other
Revenues
Total
Local
Revenues
(in mln.Rp)
1.Banjarmasin*  47.3  34.6  1.6  16.5 12,866.0
2.Bolmong  35.2  45.9  4.3  14.5  2.284.6
3.Gorontalo  36.8  51.6  0.5  11.0  2,399.4
4.Tanah Karo  24.3  27.4  -  48.3  7,089.5
5.Kudus  24.7  71.6  1.2  2.6  11,897.8
6.West Lombok  78.0  10.3  4.4  7.3  14,630.5
7.Magetan  21.9  40.9  4.0  33.1  5,609.6
8.Minahasa  74.5  18.2  0.6  6.7  7,403.7
9.Sukabumi*  16.7  80.5  0.8  2.0  7,904.4
10.Sanggau  57.5  26.8  -  15.8  1,746.5
11.Solok  23.9  31.1  5.2  39.8  2,825.1
12.Simalungun  62.3  30.8  -  6.9  5,123.4
13.Deli Serdang  67.8  30.0  -  2.2  12,508.1
Note: * Kota
Source: SMERU field surveys results.
Table 5
Percentage increase in local revenues (PAD) target for 2001
compare with realization in 1999/2000
Kabupaten
Total Local
Revenue in
1999/2000
Target local
revenue for
2001
Percentage
increase
(%)
Number of
PAD
regulations for
issued since
Jan-2000
1. Bolmong 2,284.6  4,405.6  92.8 21
2. Gorontalo  2,399.4  5,115.1  113.2 32
3. Minahasa  7,403.7  15,877.2  114.4 35
4. Karo  7,089.5  4,007.8  (43.5) 2
5. Simalungun  5,012.0  11,000.0  119.5 32
6. Deli Sedang  12,508.1  24,000.0  91.9 24
Source: SMERU field studies.
                                                                                                                                                                     
5 General mining activities that mostly exploited by local people with using simple method.
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“Recycled” Regulations on PAD
Before the regional autonomy policy was formulated, the central government issued
Law No.18, 1997 regarding those economic activities on which local governments
were permitted to impose levies. The main aim of this legislation was reduce the
number of local levies in order to reduce the high cost economy in the regions.  As a
result of this law, hundreds of local regulations were abolished. Consequently, many
kabupaten faced a significant decrease in their local revenue (PAD).
Since the implementation of regional autonomy, however, local governments have
complained about this matter and have lobbied the central government to revise Law
No.18, 1997 which severely limits the capacity of local governments to increase their
local revenues. The central government responded, and issued Law No.34, 2000. The
new law abolished the limitations on the revenue raising capacity of the regions.
However, the central government has maintained its authority to review or to abolish
local regulations if they are believed to be creating economic distortions.
In practice, senior local governments officials in those kabupaten investigated
between February and May 2001, had not yet studied the details of Law 34, 2000.
Nevertheless, they have adopted the view that the new law gives them full freedom
to impose more levies.  As a result, each of these local governments have produced
new regulations and have also recycled existing regulations on taxes and levies
banned under Law No.18, 1977. Kabupaten Simalungun, one of kabupaten studied
has issued 13 recycled regulations on taxes and levies along with 19 other new
regulations during the year 2000 (see Appendix).
Similarly, in Kabupeten Deli Serdang, 18 regulations were recycled in 2000. Officials
within the Legal Section at the Bupati’s Office in Kabupaten Deli Serdang claimed
that Law No.18, 1997 can no longer be accepted, as it is not in accordance with the
spirit of regional autonomy.  As a result, various levies that were banned under Law
No.18, 1997 are presently being reinstated.  Meanwhile, these officials claim that
Law No. 34, 2000 cannot yet be used as a reference point because it has only just
been released, and there has not yet been adequate opportunity to study the new law.
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Until now, the local governments of Kabupaten Simalungun and Karo are not
considering revising any of their local regulations. This will only occur if conflicts are
evident between the implemented regulations and Law No. 34, 2000.
Arguments Behind the Increase in Local Revenues and the Issue of New Regulations
Local officials in the five kabupaten investigated (Simalungun, Karo, Gorontalo,
Bolmong, and Minahasa) give at least six main reasons why their governments are so eager
to increasing the level of PAD during the initial implementation of regional autonomy.
1. A relatively large increase in authority also requires a more substantial budget.
However, the central government has only allocated 25% of domestic revenues
to the regions (all kabupaten).
2. The DAU block grants received by the kabupaten and kota governments are only
enough to finance routine expenditure, leaving less than 25 % remaining to
finance development expenditure (see Table 6).
Table 6
Percentage increase in routine expenditure and implications
for the development budget for 2001
( in trillions of rupiah )
Kabupaten
Routine
Expenditure
1999/2000
Estimated
Routine
budget
For 2001
Percentage
Increase
(%)
DAU
Block
Grant for
2001
Remaining for
development budget
For 2001
  (Rp)           ( % )
1.Bolmong 53.4  111.3 108.4 140.8   29.5           21.0
2.Gorontalo 69.9  128.2 83.4 148.6   20.4           13.7
3.Minahasa 117.7  236.9 101.3 260.4   23.5             9.0
4.Simalungun 99.3  192.0 93.4 260.3   68.3           26.2
6.Karo 56.3  93.6 66.3 92.5    -1.1            -1.2
Source: Field survey results of SMERU
3. The financial capacity of the region is the main factor that will determine the
successful implementation of regional autonomy, and consequently kabupaten and kota
governments should increase their local revenues as much as possible (Simalungun).
4. Local revenue is a symbol of independence of the kabupaten and kota (all kabupetan).
5. The Legal Affairs Section of these kabupaten is deliberately creating as many
local regulations for PAD as possible, in order to capture all available potential
resources within the kabupaten. Many of these local regulations may be in
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conflict with Law No. 34, 2000. If this occurs, then these regulations will be
revised following an examination of the contents of Law No.34, or a reprimand
from the central government. The local governments believe that these local
regulations need to be implemented first so that the implications and effects on
the region are apparent. Those local regulations that make a significant financial
contribution to the region will be maintained, while those which do not will be
abolished. All potential sources of revenue must be explored. Regarding central
government sanctions, should these regulations contravene Presidential Decrees,
government regulations, or laws, then the local regulations will have to be revised.
6. Every regional office has to compete to find appropriate sources of funds,
especially to increase regional revenue.  According to the Local Revenue Offices,
the allocation from the Regional Budget for the year 2001 for each local
government office (dinas) will be depend on the amount that each is able to
contribute to the Local Treasury.
5. THE IMPACT OF EXCESSIVE LEVIES: PROBABLE TRENDS
Since the new local regulations on taxes and levies have not been fully implemented
in those areas, investigated a more detailed study of their impact on the local business
climate is not yet possible. However, should these regulations be fully implemented, local
business people (farmers and traders) believe that these taxes and levies will have a
negative impact on their economic activities. Some of the likely trends are noted below.
• Increased distribution costs
The abundant agricultural commodities in each kabupaten are mostly perishable goods.
Therefore, it is crucial to secure smooth and rapid distribution of these goods to maintain
both quality and price at the consumer level.  Consequently, farmers and traders make
every effort to expedite the delivery of these goods to the buyers, even if they have to pay
various taxes and levies during the transport of goods to market. These additional charges
add to the distribution costs, and eventually lead to higher prices at the consumer level.
The amount of the levies extracted is usually determined by measuring the tonnage of
trucks at various weighing stations along main transport routes. Box 1 illustrates the
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number of weigh bridges6 and the amount of levies paid by a truck driver at each location
traveling from Kabupaten Karo, North Sumatra to Jakarta.
Box 1.  Fines and levies paid for transporting oranges
from Kabupaten Karo to Jakarta
A truck driver who regularly carries oranges from Kabupaten Karo to Jakarta reports that there are at
least 16 truck weighing stations and several other levy checkpoints that have to be passed along the
route.  The table below shows the number and amount of “fines” paid by truck drivers – both for those
who comply and those who do not comply with the weight limit at each station.
  1.  Weighing Station
Province Number of
stations
Amount of fines Remarks
1. North
Sumatra
4 Rp5,000 – 10,000 for each
ton of excess weight
Per ton of excess weight
2. Riau 2 Rp60,000, paid by all,
irrespective of weight of
load.
Fines have to be paid by both compliant
and non-compliant vehicles, plus
additional road levies:
-Rp2,500 (6-ton truck)
-Rp3,500 (8-ton truck)
3 .Jambi 2 Rp60,000, paid by all trucks Plus additional road levies:
-Rp2,500 (6-ton truck)
-Rp3,500 (8-ton truck)
4. South
Sumatra
5 Fine of Rp15,000 for each
ton of excess weight
In addition to the possibility of receiving
a fine, there are also road levies:
-Rp2,500 (6-ton truck)
-Rp3,500 (8-ton truck)
5. Lampung 3 Fine of Rp15,000 for each
ton of excess weight
In addition to the possibility of receiving
a fine, there are also  road levies:
-Rp2,500 (6-ton truck)
-Rp3,500 (8-ton truck)
2. Official and non-official levies at Pelabuhan Bakauheuni, Lampung:
Type of levies and charges Amount Remarks
-Stamp Fees
-Fee to raise the barrier
-Preman charges
Rp3,000
Rp3,000
Rp2,000
Illegal levies are collected at the Ferry Harbor in
Bakauheni
-Fees to gain early
departure
Rp15,000 To secure priority when there is a long queue
-Quarantine Rp1,000 Official levy at the Gayam Quarantine Post
-Agricultural produce Levy Rp7,000 Official levy applied to all types of transport vehicles
It is estimated that the total amount of levies (official and non-official) paid to transport oranges from
Kabanjahe to Jakarta ranges from Rp268,500 to Rp1,008,500.  Paying the lowest amount would only
be possible if the truck complies with its permitted capacity.
Nevertheless, even when trucks comply with the regulations, drivers frequently still have to pay levies.
As a result, it is common for truck drivers to prefer to carry loads that exceed the trucks legal capacity.
                                                          
6 The Office of Transport (DLLAJ) have admitted that  reopening the weighing stations under the
guise of regional autonomy has created a dilemma.  Basically, the main function of these stations is to
limit the physical damage to the road system (particularly on state and provincial roads), and to check
on the origin and destination of the transported goods.  However, it is apparent that the weigh bridges
will also  function as a means of collecting local revenues.
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• Forcing Down Prices at the Farmer or Producer Level
The wholesalers at the kabupaten level interviewed reported that if the burden of
levies is too high, they will have to shift some of the burden to the purchase price at
the farm gate.  Most local farmers fully understand this situation.  Therefore,
although the various taxes and levies are not directly charged to the farmers, they
know that the wholesalers or the middlemen will have to reduce the purchase price of good
at the farm gate because of the burden of the levies paid out at the various checkpoints.
In fact, many traders have indicated that they are prepared to make some contribution
to the local government as long as the levies are official, are not too numerous, and as
long as the total amount is reasonable and manageable. There has to be some doubts
regarding the guarantees provided by local government officials obtained during the
interviews, who maintain that the amount of the levies has been carefully considered
so as not to put too much burden on farmers and consumers.  In practice, traders have
frequently informed farmers that they have to lower the farm gate prices due the
various taxes, levies and other related charges.  The local governments have no
mechanisms in place to prevent traders or middlemen from shifting the additional costs
on to farmers.  This situation indicates that the local governments have a short-term
perspective and have been partial and one-sided in the policies that they have adopted.
• Accelerating The High Cost Economy and Social Unrest
The increasing number of taxes and levies on business activities has spurred a high
cost economy even though these taxes, levies, contributions, and other similar
charges are not directly related to the production process.  However, all such levies
should be regarded as elements of expenditure that do directly affect the market price
at the various levels of distribution (from middlemen traders, to wholesalers and retailers).
Consequently, the market price does not merely reflect the real production cost.
Another potential impact of the application of these taxes is the possibility of social
unrest in the form of public disobedience. In the current uncertain social and political
climate in Indonesia, any government policy deemed to be detrimental to the interests of
the large section of the population for particular groups within the community tends to
result in protests or opposition.  Such a trend is already becoming apparent.  For
example, the Association of Palm Oil Producers (GAPKI) in Medan, North Sumatra, is
planning to challenge all local regulations that have been applied to their business
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activities, including those regulations on Third Party Contributions7.  On one hand, the
reason for the opposition is to prevent a high cost economy in order to safeguard the
long-term business sustainability of farmers and entrepreneurs, as well as to maintain the
competitiveness of North Sumatra’s export commodities. On the other hand, it may also
serve as a warning to the local government against the formulation or imposition of
unfair taxes or levies on the local business community.
Another indication of opposition is the protest from the Gabion Belawan
Association of Fishing Entrepreneurs against various levies imposed on them by the
Provincial Government of North Sumatra.  The Association believes that most of
these levies were “fabricated” since they are not based on the provision of any government
services. The members claim that up until now they have never received any services from
the local government and are under no obligation to pay the levies (see Box 2).
Box 2.   The Fisheries Association of Gabion Belawan (AP2GB): Protests about the local
government's taxation policy on marine products
Currently, the fishing communities which are gathered under the umbrella of AP2GB, have become restless.
This is due to two reasons: firstly, the production volume of the total fish catch has been steadily declining, and
secondly, the implementation of regional autonomy policy has motivated the local government of North
Sumatra to take steps to increase regional revenues from fishing. The government's plans are already being
realized, with the establishment of the Single Office for Marine Administration (Samsat Kelautan) which will
assume responsibility for collecting the various maritime levies that have been applied by the Provincial
Government of North Sumatra.
The grievances of the AP2GB members have been expressed at every meeting of the Marine Administration as
well as in a number of petitions. In one of the petitions directed to the head of North Sumatra's local assembly,
AP2GB addressed the following issues: a) Perda No. 5, 1999 regarding fishing boat docking and mooring levies.
This levy is considered thoroughly inappropriate because it is identical to the docking service charges paid to the
Perum Prasarana Perikanan Samudera in Belawan. Furthermore, the local government itself has not yet provided
any facilities whatsoever for fishing boat docking; (b) Perda No.7, 1999 regarding wholesaler and shopping
complex levies. This is also considered to be inappropriate impost, as the local government has not yet
established any such location to sell or auction fish. Selling fish at auctions, a common practice in Java, has yet
to be introduced in North Sumatra. The recommendation to establish a supervised fish auction as regulated by
Perda No. 13, 1987 has now been cancelled because this regulation had been abolished by the Ministry of
Internal Affairs; (c) The Office for Marine Administration may be set up but only on the condition that it does
not add to the bureaucratic red tape that may impede the fishermen’s daily operations.
Another petition which was signed by association members was directed to the Head of the Local Revenue
Office and the Head of the Fisheries Office, of the Provincial Government of North Sumatra.  The association
protested about the sharp rise in the scale of levies on the sale of fish, which have increased by 200%, from
Rp25/kg to Rp75/kg. This increase is regarded as too steep and overlooks the fact that until now, the local
government has not provided fishermen with any services. For example, in the middle of 1999, when fighting
erupted amongst street thugs, no protection was provided for the fishermen. As a result, the fishing wharf at Gabin and
25 fishing boats were destroyed. The association suggested that the rise in levies be limited to 60% or Rp40/ kg.
                                                          
7 Local government requirement for local big scale business activities to pay a certain amount of
money as direct contribution to local economic development.
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• Weakening Local Competitiveness and Commodity Exports
In the long term, if this high cost economy continues, the eventual impact will be to
weaken the competitiveness of local export commodities, which have always been
the one of the key sources of financial support in this region.  In addition, a high cost
economy may result in a reduction in local economic activity, as some business
leaders are forced to close down or move their business enterprises elsewhere. Eraly
signs of such a trend are becoming apparent.  One NGO in Medan, North Sumatra
explained that several rattan handcraft businesses in the region, are considering
relocating their businesses to other kabupaten if  local taxes become too burdensome.
• Main Goal of Autonomy Overlooked: Increasing the Quality of Public
Services
One of the main objectives of the regional autonomy policy is increasing the quality
of public services at the kabupaten level of government. This can be achieved by
simplifying bureaucratic licensing procedures as well as reducing the administrative
costs and the time needed to obtain licenses and business permits. Regional
autonomy should promote efficiency and economic development at the kabupaten
level. In reality, however, local governments tend to forget these major objectives.
Instead, they are deliberately imposing levies on all economic activities in their
regions with the sole aim of increasing PAD to the greatest extent possible.
• Conflict of Interest Between the Province and Kabupaten/Kota Through
Overlapping Taxes and Levies
Under regional autonomy, kabupaten and kota governments have the key role and
greater authority than the provincial governments. As a result, hierarchical
relationship between the provinces and the kabupaten is no longer in operation.  The
kabupaten governments have used the policy as an opportunity to move away from
provincial government influence. On the other hand, the provincial governments are
attempting to maintain their power and influence. Consequently, the provinces have
also produced many regulations on PAD, many of which duplicate regulation that
have also been issued by kabupaten and kota governments. As a result, there will be
many economic activities which will be hit twice by levies with similar content.
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6.   CONCLUSION AND KEY FINDINGS
Under regional autonomy, the transfer of funds to the local governments is generally
larger than the funds that those administration received from the central government
prior to the introduction of these reform.  However, with the implementation of
autonomy, the total budget for routine expenditure for the local government has
more than doubled. As a result, not all kabupaten and kota government have surplus
funds for their development budgets. In addition, the size of the DAU block grants
are also smaller than the total amount of funds injected into the kabupaten in the pre-
autonomy era, both through transfer to local government and through the DIP
funding to central government “vertical” offices operating at the kabupaten level.
This has created new problems at the kabupaten level.  The financial capacity of local
governments is weaker than before, but at the same time they are now required to
provide a wider range and a higher quality of public services. Local government have
tried to solve the problem by increasing local revenues. However, this tends to
produce new distortions and more inefficiency at the kabupaten level.
During the regional autonomy era, it is estimated that the number of new taxes and
levies will increase significantly. There is a clear indication that local governments
have been deliberately exploiting the momentum of regional autonomy to strengthen
their financial base in any way they can.  Despite public criticism, these local
governments have continued to carry out this policy.  Many parties are of the opinion
that the majority of the taxes and levies that have been introduced have been created
simply to collect as much revenue as possible, while disregarding the long-term
potential distorting impacts. The extent of local government awareness of the
potential impact of such policies remain unclear.
Many entrepreneurs and traders are beginning to complain about the increasing
number of levies. If the policy of regional autonomy is only to be exploited as means
of providing the regions with legitimate tools to increase the tax burden on the
community without the compensation of better public services, the business
community will have ample reason to oppose the implementation of regional
autonomy.  Signs of such opposition towards local government policy are becoming
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apparent, as in the case of GAPKI and AP2GB in North Sumatra.  If this continues
under regional autonomy, the intended goal of providing better public services to
improve people’s welfare, will remain an empty slogan.  Many groups have recently
begun to express their concerns that if too much unchecked authority is placed in the
hands of regional government,  the creative will be encouraged to act arbitrarily.
With large funds at their disposal, many fear that this will only lead to the creation of
“little kingdoms” in the regions ruled by “little dictators” 8.
Many of the above issues are related to local government revenue.  However, there
are also important problems related to regional expenditure.  In this case, kabupaten
governments have tended to ignore the need to give priority to planning to raise the
level of public services.  Up until now, for example, the regions still have no scale of
priorities for the provision of standard services (except in the provision of permits) to
boost the business climate in their area.   Many local governments have not decided
on the requirements of the development budget in accordance with the services that
have to be delivered.  The vague and unsatisfactory answer frequently given by senior
local officials whenever questions are raised about this issue, is that the local
development program will be formulated based on the available budget. Therefore, it
is not surprising that local governments are currently focusing all their attention on
locating the maximum amount of revenues to increase their development budget. This
has been further strengthened by the fact that the DAU received by most regions from
the central government is barely sufficient to fund the routine expenditure requirements
of the local bureaucracy.
Many of the technical guidelines related to Law 22, 1999 and Law 25, 1999 have not
yet been drafted, and consequently some regions have attempted their own
interpretation of these two laws, and have then drafted their own local regulations
based on their interpretation.  The kabupaten governments are not concerned that
their regulations might contradict with the central government’s regulations.  For
example, in Kabupaten Deli Serdang, the government will continue its plan to form
                                                          
8 Such trend has already become apparent in those regions with abundant natural resources. Local
governments in these regions have started to demand a more dominant role in the operation of the
state-owned enterprises located in their regions. As the “owners” of the regions, now kabupaten
governments are asking for a fair share of the profit of these enterprises.
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an Office of Land Affairs even though this office has been abolished through
Presidential Decree No 895, 2000 that was later reinforced by Presidential Decree
No. 10, 2001. However, local officials believe that any law challenged by the central
government will have no strong basis because the regional regulation is based on Law
No.22, 1999 which occupies a higher authority than a presidential decree in the
Indonesian legal system.
Why would the regions dare to take such a step? Are local governments no longer
afraid of central government intervention?  The most common response from
regional officials is that the central government has to be “challenged” by the regions
for the following reasons:
1. The central government is reluctant  to hand over autonomy to the regions.  It is
evident that the central government is still interested in managing the regions,
particularly concerning those productive sectors of the economy that have been
the major sources of government revenue.
2. The central government has been inconsistent in implementing the regional
autonomy laws.  On one hand, the regions are expected to be self-reliant, but on
the other hand the central government has not provided sufficient opportunity
for the regions to receive a fair share of the revenues gained from the
exploitation of the regions’ own rich natural resources.
3. The amount of the General Allocation of Funds (DAU) provided for the regions
is relatively large. However, after covering the wages of the central government
employees and considering the increased responsibility for local government
services, most of the allocated budget is only sufficient to fund routine local
government expenditure.
This situation has boosted local governments’ enthusiasm for increasing local
revenue, even though in the long term (consciously or unconsciously) such
endeavors will have negative impact on the local business climate.
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APPENDIX
Draft Local Regulations on proposed levies, Kabupaten Simalungun, 2000
Status of Levies
No Title of Draft Local Regulation
Dinas/
Implementing
Agency
Under Law
No.18, 1997
Approaching
/During  Regional
Autonomy era
Remarks/Status of
Draft Regulation
1. Use of Ground and Surface Water Mining Became a tax Taxed Being drafted
2. Third Party Contributions Regional
Treasury
N/A Taxed Has been amended
3. Disturbance Permit (HO) Regional
Treasury
Taxed Taxed Has been amended
4. Hotels and Restaurants Tax Regional
Treasury
Taxed Taxed Has been amended
5. Exploitation of Local Natural Resources Levy Bina Marga Taxed Taxed Has been amended
6. Recreation and Sporting Venues Levy Tourism Taxed Taxed Has been amended
7. Printing cost of Family Cards, ID cards, and
Civil Registration Documents  Levy
Civil
Registrar
Taxed Taxed Has been amended
8. Worker Welfare Assistance Manpower N/A Taxed Has been amended
9. Municipal Waste Disposal/ Sanitation and Parks  Levy Sanitation Taxed Taxed Has been amended
10. Public Cemeteries and Parks  Levy Sanitation Taxed Taxed Has been amended
11. Fees for the Registration of Industries and
Industrial Assistance
Industry Abolished Taxed Has been amended
12. Building Construction Levy Public Works Taxed Taxed Has been amended
13. Transportation route Levy Road
Transport
Taxed Taxed Has been amended
14. Health Service Levy Health Taxed Taxed Has been amended
15. State and Private Plantations Enterprise
Contributions to the Governments
Plantations N/A Will be
reintroduced
Being drafted
16. Permits for the Supply of Electricity for
Privately owned Business and for Public Use
Mining N/A Will be
reintroduced
Being drafted
17. Establishment of Local Depot, Fuel Stations Mining N/A Will be
reintroduced
Being drafted
18. General Mining Activities Mining N/A Will be
reintroduced
Being drafted
19. Permits for the Use of Timber on Privately-
owned Property
Forestry N/A Will be
reintroduced
Has been amended
20. Permits the Use of non-timber Forest Products Forestry N/A Will be
reintroduced
Has been amended
21. Livestock Transport Health Inspection Levy  Livestock Abolished Will be
reintroduced
Being drafted
22. Project Bidding Documentation Public Works Abolished Will be
reintroduced
Being drafted
23. Purchased of Privately-owned Heavy Equipment Public Works Abolished Will be
reintroduced
Being drafted
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Appendix (cont’d.)
Status of Levies
No Titles of Draft Legislation
Dinas /
Implementing
Agency
Under Law
No.18, 1997
Approaching/
During Regional
Autonomy era
Remarks/Status of
draft regulation
24. Laboratory Testing Fees Public Works Taxed Will be
reintroduced
Being drafted
25. Periodic Motor Vehicle Inspection Levy
in Kabupaten Simalungun levies
Road
Transport
Taxed Will be
reintroduced
Being drafted
26. Rice Milling Enterprises and  Rice Hulling
Levy
Agriculture Abolished Will be
reintroduced
Being drafted
27. Compulsory Business Registration Trade Abolished Will be
reintroduced
Being drafted
28. Origin of Goods Documentation Trade N/A Will be
reintroduced
Being drafted
29. Trading Permit Certificates Trade N/A Will be
reintroduced
Being drafted
30. Warehouse Levy Trade N/A Will be
reintroduced
Being drafted
31. Regulation of Restaurants and Bars Tourism Abolished Will be
reintroduced
Being drafted
32. Regulation of Hotel Businesses under the
Bung Melt and  Pondok Wisata category
Tourism Abolished Will be
reintroduced
Being drafted
Note : N/A = information unavailable
Source : Legal Section, Regional Government Secretariat, Kabupaten Simalungun.
